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Comments and Casenotes
Shoplifting And The Law Of Arrest: A Problem
In Effective Social Legislation
"For the most part, the purpose of the criminal law is
only to induce external conformity to rule."
-Holmes, The Common Law*
In the area of effective social control of shoplifting, the
need for statutory alteration of the common law rule has
become increasingly apparent in recent years. Many states
have enacted statutes in response to this need. The intro-
duction of legislation in the 1956 session of the Maryland
legislature, and indications of further pressure for this in
the current session, suggests the advisability of careful
analysis of the problem.
I.
In a crowded department store, on Christmas Eve, a
customer was seen removing things from the open counters
where they were displayed and putting them into his poc-
kets. The elderly gentleman, a retired process server, was
stopped by a store detective and her assistant, who had
witnessed the actions, and was taken to the second floor
offices of the store. After twenty minutes of denials, the
customer was found to have in his possession the goods
he was accused of having taken. He nevertheless refused
to sign the store's confession blank, and was therefore ar-
rested. In the ensuing criminal trial, held the day after
Christmas, he was found innocent. He then filed suit for
false arrest and malicious prosecution. On the first count
the jury found in his favor, fixing damages at $3,500.00.1
This is one of the many reported decisions where a per-
son, who was believed to have committed larceny, has ob-
tained a large verdict against an honest merchant whose
sole fault lay in a desire to protect his own property. It
* THE COMMAN LAW (1881), Lecture II 'The Criminal Law," reprinted
in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES (1943) 62.1 Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 44 P. 2d 638 (Cal. App. 1935), rev'd 5 Cal.
2d 175, 54 P. 2d 20 (1936). Although this judgment was reversed on appeal,
the case is a clear exemplification of possible jury reaction to false im-
prisonment claims. Under Maryland law, it appears that the verdict would
have 'been sustained, see n. 2 infra, and the case is one in which a modi-
fication of the older common-law was required to support the equitable
result obtained on the appeal (see n. 9 infra).
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would appear that a similar result could be reached in
Maryland.2
Each year, goods the value of which is conservatively
estimated to be over $100,000,000.00, are removed from
stores by shoplifters. In Maryland it is estimated that
between $2,000,000.00 and $3,000,000.00 per year is lost in
this way.4 Accurate figures are impossible to obtain due
to the accounting methods customarily employed by large
stores. Many believe that the actual figures exceed these
estimates.5
In addition to the amount of the annual loss, shoplift-
ing has other ramifications: professional shoplifters are,
of necessity, associated with the nationwide underworld of
receivers, or "fences", and many of the thieves, although not
themselves narcotic addicts, use a large portion of their
daily proceeds to support narcotic addiction in others.'
II.
The main difficulties that the merchant faces in his at-
tempts to protect his own property are caused by the appli-
cation of common-law rules relating to false arrest and
false imprisonment. Although he may have a highly de-
veloped system of detection, in the case of the larger de-
partment stores, or have his entire staff on the lookout in
the smaller stores, ultimately these protection services are
faced with the difficult decision of whether to detain the
suspect for a short time in an effort to determine if there
has in fact been a crime committed by him, and in so doing
risk suit for false imprisonment and false arrest, or to
allow the suspect to leave the store carrying with him the
merchant's property.
2 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173, 122 A. 2d 457 (1956),
where it is said:
"In the . . . action for false imprisonment, there must be a depri-
vation of the liberty of another without his consent and without legal
justification. Although intent is necessary, 'malice' is not, nor is prob-
able cause a defense. Fleischer v. Ensminger, 140 Md. 604, 620; Prosser,
Torts, 2d ed. p. 52."
3Wall Street Journal, October 31st, 1956.
'Retail Merchants of Baltimore; Cf. $12,500,000.00 estimated in Pennsyl-
vania in The Shoplifting Problem in Pennsylvania, 61 Dickinson L. Rev.
255 (1957), and $4,500,000.00 for Florida mentioned in the preamble to
the shoplifting statute enacted in that state.
5Waltz, Shoplifting and the Law of Arrest: The Merchant's Dilemma,
62 Yale L. J. 788 (1953) fn. 5, where, on the basis of the 1948 United States
Census of Business, the author concludes that in 1948 the total national
loss was $246,106,000.00.
OWaltz, ibid, 791; Interviews. The author interviewed a number of
merchants, enforcement and protection officers, and much of the factual
data herein was culled from these talks. Occasionally this has been noted
in the footnotes. Names of the persons interviewed have been withheld.
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It is submitted that the common-law rules, developed
at a time when the modern merchandising methods were
unknown, are ill-adapted to the current needs.
The tort of false imprisonment is one of the most ancient
known to Anglo-American law. There is evidence of a
highly developed rule relating to the wrong as early as
1348.7 This rule is applicable in all its stringency in Mary-
land today.' In some states, in the absence of statute, a
limited privilege of temporary detention for investigation
is afforded.9 The Restatement of Torts 2d has recognized
this privilege.'" There it is stated:
"One who reasonably believes that another has
tortiously taken a chattel upon his premises, or has
failed to pay for a chattel .... is privileged without
arresting the other, to detain him on the premises for
the time necessary for a reasonable investigation of
the facts."11
This is a very limited privilege.12  Although such an ap-
proach is an improvement on the older common-law rule,
7f 104 pl. 85 Lib. Assis. (1348).
"... Et nota per Thorp que imprisonment est dit en chaqun ca[s]e
ou hom[m]e est arrest per force et encontre sa volunt, tout folt en la
haut strete or aillours tout ne foit il my emprison en meason, etc."
This quotation is Norman legal French, and the following is the best trans-
lation the author was able to obtain:
"And it was noted by Thorp that imprisonment is said to occur in
each case where a man is arrested by force and against his will, in
the high street or elsewhere, and it is not necessary that one be im-
prisoned in a house, etc."
8 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 122 A. 2d 457 (1956).
'Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F. 2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952);
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Waller, 208 Ark. 1063, 189 S.W. 2d 361
(1945) ; Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co., 44 P. 2d 638 (Cal. App. 1935) rev'd
in 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P. 2d 20 (1936) ; Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, 11 Cal.
App. 2d 430, 54 P. 2d 24 (1936); Tell v. May Department Stores Co., 348
Mo. 696, 155 S.W. 2d 74 (1941); Cohen v. Lit Bros., 166 Pa. Super. 206,
70 A. 2d 419 (1950); Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172
S.W. 2d 13 (1943). See also, as to the detention of one suspected of failure
to pay for services: Cox v. Rhodes Avenue Hospital. 198 Ill. App. 82 (1916)
Standish v. Narragansett S.S. Co., 111 Mass. 512, 15 Am. Rep. 66 (1873);
Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N.E. 843, 26 A.L.R.
1329 (1923); Lynch v. Metropolitan El. R. Co., 90 N.Y. 77, 43 Am. Rep.
141 (1882). All of these cases are discussed at length in an excellent
Comment, The Protection and Recapture of Merchandise from Shoplifters.
46 Ill L. Rev. 887 (1952) and 47 Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 82 (1952).10 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND (1957) Tentative Draft No. 1.
u Op. cit ibid, §120A.
1 "The specific problem is that of the suspected shoplifter in the
department store or other place of business. When a man is appar-
ently lifting goods off a counter, the shopkeeper is put in a very diffi-
cult position. He must either go ahead and detain that individual, in
which case he risks liability for false imprisonment or for false arrest,
in case he calls a policeman, or he must sit there or stand -there and
let the individual walk out of his shop, perhaps with the goods con-
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there is still the uncertainty whether the courts of any
particular jurisdiction will accept it as a reasonable allevi-
ation of the harsh results of earlier cases. If accepted, the
Restatement rule still leaves the position of the merchant
very uncertain.'
Related to the law of false imprisonment, yet distinct
from it, is the law of false arrest. Both at common-law,
and under the statutes of all the states having legislation
on the subject, it is settled that an officer may arrest with-
out a warrant for a felony committed in his presence,
when a felony has in fact been committed and he has rea-
sonable grounds to believe it was committed by the person
arrested. With regard to arrest by an officer without a
warrant for a misdemeanor, two different rules are laid
down, one restricting arrests for misdemeanors to breaches
of the peace committed in his presence, the other allowing
an arrest to be made when any misdemeanor is committed
in the presence of the officer. The right of a private person
to make an arrest is more limited, and is generally said to
exist in but two situations: where the person arrested
has committed an act amounting to a breach of the peace
or a felony in the presence of the one making the arrest,
and where a felony has in fact been committed and the
person making the arrest has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the person arrested has committed it. Under
these principles, where the suspect has merely committed
a misdemeanor by the theft of goods, an arrest by a private
person would not be warranted and would subject the per-
son to liability for false arrest.14
cealed on his person, with a fair certainty that he will never see him
again. Whatever he does, he is likely to be wrong.
"In that situation, about a dozen courts now .. .have developed
this very limited privilege on the part of a shopkeeper to detain the
suspected thief for a short period of time, simply to investigate the
facts, to check whether he has paid for the thing that he is carrying
out of the store, to ascertain his name, identity or address, or to do
whatever else is reasonable under the circumstances.
"It is obviously a very limited privilege."
Prosser, 1957 Proceedings of the American Law Institute, 281.
'8Dean Prosser, the Reporter, recognizes this. Of the privilege, worked
out on common-law bases, he says:
"It may be fairly futile. It does not include the power of search
so far as the cases indicate. It may be fairly futile, except that the
detention itself is likely to produce a result by making the shoplifter
try to make a deal to get out of it. It has some value." Op. cit. ibid. 283.
u AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, (1930)§§21, 22, 25, 26, 36, and especially commentary to §21 at page 231; HoCH-
HIMEa, THE LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, (2d ed., 1904) 80,
Ch. 10, and especially 83, §67, Arrest without Process; Thomas, Procedure
in Justice Cases (1909) 271, § 343; Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Mary-
land, 5 Md. L. Rev. 125 (1941).
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In addition to the civil liability the merchant risks under
the present law, there is also the possibility that he may
be held criminally accountable. Both false arrest and false
imprisonment are common-law crimes.1 5
In view of the risks that the merchant runs each time
he detains one who is suspected of having stolen property
on the premises of his place of business, the merchant must
be very sure of the guilt of a suspect before he is willing
to ask any questions. 6
III.
The protection afforded by the police (very little, due
to the practicalities of law enforcement) is but slight de-
terence to the systematic raids of the professional, and of
practically no value in guarding against the amateur. The
professional restricts his activities to the higher price
articles, and the police, when they do act, may be of some
assistance in his apprehension. The amateur, however, has
more cosmopolitan interests and, although less loss is at-
tributable to his forays, he is much more difficult to appre-
hend.' 7 The larger stores can afford the protection serv-
ices of a full-time, trained staff of persons skilled in the
detection, apprehension, and handling of those seen steal-
ing. The smaller stores are unable so to protect themselves,
and are forced to rely on the discretion and untrained abili-
ties of their regular sales personnel. Mechanical devices
are expensive, of limited usefulness, and are not generally
employed. Only in the larger stores are any numbers of
persons caught in the act. The professional and the more
careful amateurs are seldom caught in the act and, in view
of the current state of the law, only rarely detained for
investigation.'8
15Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A. 2d 209 (1958) ; HOCHHEIMER, ibid.
§316, False Imprisonment. The definition of false imprisonment is broad
enough to include false arrest; it would appear that false arrest could
also be considered as a type of assault, HOCHHEEMER, ibid, §254, assault.
Interviews.
"Interviews. This is due to the larger number of amateur shoplifters,
most of whom were characterized as "impulse shoplifters" (i.e. those who
yielded to the attractions of the modern merchandising display) and to
the difficulty of determining in advance what might appeal to any one
amateur. Much of the merchandise recovered from amateurs, both in de-
partment and grocery stores, is of trifling value. It is the number of such
thefts rather than the amount stolen at any one time which causes sub-
stantial loses to be attributed to amateurs.
" Interviews. Many persons, not actually seen in the act, are allowed
to leave stores even though a few questions would suffice to establish the
suspect's guilt or innocence. In the main, those questions go unasked




Because of the special character of the merchants' prob-
lems, statutes have been enacted in twenty-three states
affording some measure of protection against shoplifting. 9
These statutes range from an amendment of a general lar-
ceny statute,20 to statutes allowing the merchant, mer-
chant's employee, or a peace officer, to detain those whom
they have reasonable grounds for suspecting are guilty
of the specifically defined crime of shoplifting, for a rea-
sonable time and in a reasonable manner.2' A classification
of these statutes may be of assistance in analyzing what
these statutes have accomplished:
1. Amendment of the general larceny statute:
Massachusetts 22
2. Defining the crime of shoplifting:
a. In terms of possession or wilful concealment:
Arizona,23 Idaho,24 Maine,25 Mississippi, 26 New
Hampshire,27 North Carolina,28
b. In terms of the traditional larceny concept:
(i) with a presumption from the posses-
sion of goods:
Arkansas, 29 Kentucky,30  Pennsyl-
vania,3 ' South Carolina,82
(ii) without such presumption:
Georgia,33 Virginia."
"These statutes are analyzed and classified below. The reference for
each state appears at the appropriate place In the analysis.
"09A ANN. LAWS MASS. (1956), Ch. 276, §28.
1See the analysis below.
29A ANN. LAWS MASS. (1956), Ch. 276, §28.
"LAWS ARIz. (1958), Ch. 8 (§13-673).
"IDAHO CODE (1957 Cum. Supp.) §18-4626.
"4 REv. STATS. ME. (1957 Cum. Supp.), Ch. 132, §10-A.
2H.B. 90.
'"LAWS N.H. (1957) Ch. 81.
01B GEN. STATS. N.C. (1957 Cum. Supp.) §14-72.1.
"lAcTs ARx. (1957), Art. 50, §4.
- H.B. 25, Ch. 11, §1 (1958), will be 1 K.R.S. §433.234.
-"18 P.S. (1958 P.P.) §4816.1.
"12 S.C. CODE (1958 Cum. Supp.) §16-357.1-4.
"310 GA. CODE ANN. (1958 Cum. P.P.) §§26-2640---26-2642.
"14 CODE VA. (1958 Cum. Supp.) §§18-187.1-3.
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3. Allowing reasonable detention of a suspect by the
merchant without incurring civil or criminal lia-
bility:
Alabama,8 5 Arkansas," Arizona, 7 Florida,88
Georgia, 9 Illinois (civil immunity only)," Ken-
tucky,4 Minnesota (detention for limited purpose
only),42 Mississippi (suspect may be questioned
but not searched) ,4 Nebraska,44 Ohio,45 Okla-
homa (detention until a peace officer may be
summoned) ,4 Pennsylvania,4 7 Tennessee, 4 Utah.49
4. Other approaches:
Montana: "Any merchant shall have the right
to request any individual on his premises to place
or keep in full view any merchandise such indi-
vidual may have removed, or which the merchant
has reason to believe he may have removed, from
its place of display... [without being] criminally
or civilly liable for slander, false arrest, or other-
wise, on account of having made such request."50
Wisconsin: Defines a right of recapture and
allows the merchant or other owner of property
to threaten and use force against another to pre-
vent or terminate what he believes is an unlawful
interference with his property. The threat must
be reasonable and the use of force may not be
such as may cause great bodily harm or death
solely for the defense of property. A third party,
which specifically includes an employee, is ac-
corded a similar privilege.1
U53 CODE A". (1957 Supp.) §334.
AcTs ARx. (1957) Art. 50, §4.
47LAws Aniz. (1958), Ch. 8 (§§13-674-5).
U22 FLA. STAT. ANN. (1958 Cum. P.P.) §811.022.
10 GA. CODE ANN. (1958 Cum. P.P.) §§26-2640-42.
1038 Smrr HuRD ANN. STAT. ILl (1958 Cum. P.-P.) Ch. 38, §§252.1-4.
H.B. 25, Ch. 11, §1 (1958), will be K.R.S. §433.234.
0 MINN. STAT. ANN. (1958 Cum. P.P.) §622.27.
aH.B. 90.
"Nm R.S. (1957 Supp.) §29-402.01.
1129 PAGE'S Of. REV. CODE (1958 Supp.) §2935.041.
16 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1958) §1341.
18 P.S. (1958 P.P.) §4816.1.
407 TENN. CODE ANN. (1957 Cum. Supp.) §§40-824-826.
"9LAWS UTAH (1957) Ch. 166.
60 MONT. REv. CODE, Repl. Vol. 4 (1957 Cum. Supp.) §4-213.
" WIS. STATS. ANN. (West, 1958) §939.49: of. "The Protection and Re-
capture of Merchandise from Shoplifters" op. cit. supra, n. 9.
[VOL. XIX
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All of this legislation is new; prior to 1955 there were no
statutes which gave the merchant any protection in any
state. Some of the statutes are therefore worthy of com-
ment.
The most common type of statute and one which was
introduced by the Hon. Melvin R. Kenney and rejected
by the Maryland legislature in 1956 is:
"A peace officer, or a merchant, or a merchant's em-
ployee, who has probable cause for believing that goods
held for sale by the merchant have been unlawfully
taken by a person, and that he may recover them by
taking the person into custody, may, for the purpose
of effecting such recovery, take the person into cus-
tody and detain him in a reasonable manner for a rea-
sonable length of time. Such taking into custody and
detention by a peace officer, merchant, or merchant's
employee shall not render such peace officer, merchant
or merchant's employee criminally or civilly liable for
false arrest, false imprisonment or unlawful deten-
tion."52
Although the American Civil Liberties Union has stated
that it would fight this type of bill and, in the event of
its passage, attempt to have it held unconstitutional, 3
u2 H.B. 148. It was introduced by Delegate 'Kenney February 21, 1956.
Woman's Wear Daily, June 10, 1957, p. 1.
"ANTI-SHOPLIFT LAWS IN STATES FACE CHALLENGE. Inditqdual rights
issue stressed. Anti-shoplifting laws in force or pending in some twenty
odd States may be challenged on the basis of possible infringement of
individual rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
"These bills have, In most cases, been sponsored by supermarket
operators and other merchant groups and they generally provide mer-
chants, their employees and the police with some measure of immunity
from the liability of false arrest when detaining suspected shoplifters
on the premises. A prototype bill was passed by Florida in 1955 and
other States have sought to follow suit.
"In the first such step on the national level, the American Civil
Liberties Union has taken a position that the false arrest immunity
is an infringement of the 'Bill of Rights.
"Specifically, to grant immunity from a false arrest action Is an
'infringement on the right of a person to be secure in his person' as
provided in the Fourth Amendment, Patrick Murphy Malin. executive
director, A.C.L.U., said.
"The A.C.L.U. has just notified its 23 affiliates of the stand taken
by its Due Process-Equality Committee.
"No test case is planned at this time. However, It is to be ex-
pected that local civil liberties groups will offer testimony at hearings
on such bills In the various State legislatures.
"A.C.L.U. or its affiliates may also appeal to Governors to veto
such bills when they come before them for signing as well as write
letters to the newspapers and take similar steps to rally public
opinion."
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there are no reported cases in which the validity of such a
clause has been adjudicated.
Illustrative of a better compromise is the statute re-
cently enacted by the Legislature of Arizona:
"§13-673. A person who wilfully takes possession
of any goods, wares or merchandise offered for sale
by any wholesale or retail store or other mercantile
establishment without the knowledge or consent of
the seller, with the intention of converting such goods,
wares, or merchandise to his own use without having
paid the purchase price thereof, is guilty of shop-
lifting ....
"§13-674. A peace officer may, upon a charge being
made, and without a warrant, arrest any person whom
he has reasonable cause to believe has committed or
attempted to commit the crime of shoplifting or wilful
concealment in any wholesale or retail store or other
mercantile establishment.
"§13-675. Reasonable cause shall be a defense to a
civil or criminal action brought for false arrest, false
imprisonment, or wrongful detention against a police
officer, merchant or merchant's employee, by a person
suspected of shoplifting ....
A similar enactment was adopted in 1958 in Georgia, in
which it is provided that if as a result of a detention and
arrest of a person reasonably thought to be engaged in
shoplifting, the person so detained should bring suit for
false arrest or for false imprisonment against the owner
or operator of a store or his employee, no recovery may
be had if it is established that the suspect behaved in such
manner as to cause a man of reasonable prudence to be-
lieve that the suspect was shoplifting, and that the deten-
tion and arrest and the length of the detention was reason-
able.5" A 1958 Mississippi statute is of a similar type, al-
though only questioning (not search) is permitted."8
The Arizona type of statute appears to consider more
adequately than the earlier statutes the interests of both
the merchant and the public. It helps the merchant by
LAWS ARIz. (1958) Ch. 8 (§13-673).
wH.B. 91.
5 H.B. 90, Caveat: No official version of the Mississippi and Georgia
civil statutes was obtainable. Mississippi's Secretary of State forwarded
a mimeographed copy of the statute said to be the one that had been ap-
proved by the Governor April 2d, 1958; Georgia sent a copy of its earlier
enactment. In neither case were the session laws available.
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defining a specific crime of shoplifting (although that defi-
nition could be improved) and by giving him a defense
of reasonable cause against civil and criminal suits. How-
ever, it protects the public by more clearly placing the
burden of proving reasonable cause on the defendant mer-
chant, an important matter left in doubt by the Kenney
bill and its Florida prototype. It makes the crime a more
readily enforceable one by extending the power of arrest
without warrant.
V.
The problem of resolving the conflict between the in-
terests of the merchant and those of the general public
is a difficult one. The extent of the difficulty is indicated
by the different ways in which the twenty-three states
now having statutes have approached the problem.
In drafting a statute of this type, it is important to keep
in view the interests that are to be protected. An adequate
definition of the crime of shoplifting involves no counter-
vailing social interests, and without question the first ap-
proach to the problem is the enactment of an effective
criminal statute under which special consideration is given
to the shoplifting problem, not only as it exists in the larger
stores which are in the main, those which have done the
most lobbying for these bills, but also as it exists in the
smaller ones. Of all the states which have enacted statutes
defining the crime, the state which has given the most
clear, comprehensive, and detailed consideration to all of
these interests is Georgia. The statute there enacted defines
certain ascertainable indicia of the crime, i.e.,
(1) Removal of goods from the immediate place of
display;
(2) Concealment of goods removed from the place of
display;
(3) Alteration of a label or other marking on any goods;
(4) The transfer of goods from the container in which
they are displayed, to other containers."
Such treatment of the crime achieves two desirable ends:
the merchant is provided with a clear statement of what
acts constitute the statutory crime of shoplifting, and the
10 GA. ANN. CODE (1958 CuM. Supp.) §§26-2640 through 26-2642.
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crime is rather simple to prove in court. The principle
defect in the statute is the absence of presumptions which
will aid in the prosecution of offenders. All of the facts
that are essential, when such presumptions are added to
the definition, are readily provable physical ones. The tra-
ditional larceny concepts are adhered to as distinguished
from creating a new statutory crime of wilful concealment
which other states have favored. Although there are re-
quirements of intent in each of these approaches, the more
traditional one is more likely to find acceptance from the
bar and bench.5"
Although the need for precise accuracy of language in
affording statutory protection to merchants against unjusti-
fied suits is not necessarily as high as it is in establishing
a new statutory crime, still it is felt that the use of vague
words, such as "reasonable", "reasonably", etc., in the con-
texts of many of the statutes examined has the undesir-
able effect of failing to give to the public and to the mer-
chants a clear statement of what their rights are under
them. To some extent this is unavoidable due to the nature
of the subject.
There is a need for statutory protection of the merchant
against meritless civil suits. On the other hand it is not
believed that all suits should be forbidden, for where the
merchant has acted in a grossly unreasonable manner, it
is only by civil suit that the aggrieved person is afforded
any redress. The broad immunity granted by some of the
statutes is to be eschewed, but at the same time it should
be clear that to give only a definition of the crime of shop-
lifting, without providing the merchant with some means
of enforcing his new protection is insufficient.
The grant of civil (but not criminal) immunity to the
merchant or storekeeper, accompanied by provisions com-
pelling him to prosecute all those who were discovered
shoplifting, initially appealed to this author as placing the
merchant in the proper position, giving him both responsi-
bility and protection against shoplifters, while at the same
time subjecting him to public control. However, the mer-
chants seemed generally to object to the interference with
58 Illustrations of other criminal statutes with presumption are found
In 3 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 27, §13 (Barratry) ; §§192-194 (connections or
pipes circumventing gas and electric meters prima facie proof of Intent to
defraud) ; §321 (burden of proving a killed animal at place where usually
killed was not intended for human consumption rests on the party charged) ;
§376 (presence of a machine gun prima facie proof of possession or use
of the machine gun by each person occupying the room where found).
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their discretion in choosing whether or not to prosecute.59
Also, protection service personnel interviewed felt that
it would be too harsh to the truly penitent amateur to re-
quire prosecution of all cases.
In view of this, and accepting the fact that remedial
legislation should change existing business practice only
when necessary to effectuate its purposes, the author has
decided that a more desirable initial approach to affording
statutory protection to the merchant would be to grant a
"reasonable cause" defense to all actions brought for false
arrest, false imprisonment, and wrongful detention, some-
what like the approach which Arizona has recently
adopted, 0 but with the definition of the crime of shop-
lifting perfected as in the Georgia statute. The principal
difficulty with this approach lies in the definition of "rea-
sonable cause". It is as ambiguous a phrase as "reasonable"
and "reasonably" used in other statutes, and offers only
5 An illustration of the discretion used may be seen in the testimony in
the case of Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 122 A. 2d 457
(1956), October Term 1955, No. 180, Appellants Brief pp. 17-18, and App.
21 and 23:
"Q. Is it (sic) true in your employment your job is to protect the
Safeway, isn't it? A. It is.
Q. Isn't it also true to protect the patrons of the Safeway? A.
Protect the patrons?
Q. The customers? A. I guess so, I don't know anything about
that; my Job is to try to break up shoplifting.
Q. If you saw somebody had stolen something from Safeway, you
would have called the police immediately, wouldn't you? A. Not in
all cases; we let most of them go; I wouldn't say most of them; I would
say we let the majority of them go who are decent enough and say they
are sorry they did it, we let them go and that is all there is to it.
Q. You have testified that you, not only you, but detectives gen-
erally, arrest some customers and don't arrest other customers. A.
We do.
Q. Would you explain the circumstances under which you would
be likely to arrest people and when you would be likely not to arrest
people? A. Well Mr. Anderson told me-
Q. Who is Mr. Anderson? A. Mr. Anderson is head of Safeway in
Washington; he is the general superintendent; he told me to use my
own discretion if the people acted nasty, just do what I wanted to do
with them.
Q. Don't you mean that he was the Retail Operations Manager of
the Washington D. C. Division? A. That's right.
Q. What is your procedure, for instance, if you see someone take
some merchandise and put it in their pockets and then go through
the check stand without paying for it; then you accost them and
say 'How about that butter you forgot to pay for?' What happens
if they say, 'Oh yes, I forgot to pay for it' and offer to pay? A. Well,
I let them go; I hardly ever lock anybody up who is actually half-
way decent, and sorry they did it. or they have some good excuse
and they say that they are not going to do it again. If I locked
everybody up I caught, I would probably be in court all the time.
"See 8upra, n. 54.
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poor protection unless it is in some way limited or defined
in advance. This may be accomplished by the inclusion of
two provisions which, in combination, will provide the
courts with an intelligible standard of reasonableness. A
clause stating that the rule of construction that statutes
in derogation of the common-law are to be narrowly con-
strued shall not be applied, and a clause expressly provid-
ing that the statute should be construed to effect its in-
tended purpose, when accompanied by a preamble setting
out in some detail what that purpose is, should be adequate
to do this. From that point the determination of particular
factors to be considered in the evaluation of the reasonable-
ness of the belief that a suspect has committed shoplifting
would be left to the courts. To the extent that this accom-
plishes the definition of a legislative standard of reason-
ableness, the vagueness of the protection afforded by the
Restatement's rule is minimized,6 while still allowing the
interpretation to be made on a case by case basis.
In addition to the possibility of defining a new crime
of shoplifting, accompanied by statutory defenses to mer-
chants who reasonably seek to detect and secure prosecu-
tion of offenders, some consideration should be given to
the possibility of extending the practice already prevalent
in Baltimore City, of allowing the stores to designate cer-
tain of their employees as special policemen, or "peace
officers". These have deterrent value because they have
the larger powers of an officer to arrest without a warrant.
At the same time this "deputizing" process offers reassur-
ance that a certain degree of control is retained by the
police commissioner to see that enforcement under the
statute is not abused. It is thought to be beyond the scope
of this comment to consider the mechanisms of such a pro-
cedure, but from what the author has seen of the practice,
it is to be recommended.
In the light of the foregoing, the author would suggest
that the shoplifting problem can best be dealt with at
this time by the enactment of a new statute, with a pre-
amble and provisions substantially as in the proposed draft
appended hereto.2
61 See supra, n. 11-13.
2 For literature on the shoplifting problem In general, and other pro-
posed drafts, see Comment, The Shoplifting Problem in Pennsylvania, 61
Dickinson L. Rev. 255 (1957) ; Waltz, Shoplifting and the Law of Arrest:
The Merchant's Dilemma, 62 Yale L. J. 788 (1953) ; Note, Shoplifting -
An Analysis of Legal Controls, 32 Ind. L. J. 20 (1956); Mayfield, Shop-
lifting in Tennessee, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 1177 (1957).
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PRoPosED DRAFr OF SHOPLIFTING STATUTE
AN ACT ENTITLED ... etc....
WHEREAs merchants in Maryland are now suffering great
financial loss at the hands of shoplifters, and
WmREAs the retail and wholesale merchants have been
handicapped in the apprehension and prosecution of shop-
lifters, by the difficulty of identifying and prosecuting shop-
lifting under existing common law and statutory crimes,
and also by the application of the common-law rules relat-
ing to false arrest, false imprisonment, and wrongful deten-
tion, and
WHEREAS it is the sense of the Legislature that wholesale
and retail merchants should be allowed to detain persons
whose actions give rise to a reasonable belief that such
persons are engaged in the crime of shoplifting, as defined
herein, for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner
in order to ascertain the facts involved,
THEREFORE, BE IT ENACTED... etc.
SECTION 1: In any mercantile establishment, it shall be
unlawful for any person
(1) To remove any goods, wares or merchandise from
the immediate place of display with the intent to
appropriate the same to the use of the person so
taking, or to deprive the owner of the use, or value,
or any part thereof; or
(2) To obtain or attempt to obtain possession of any
goods, wares or merchandise, by falsely charging
the same to a real or fictious person with a like in-
tent; or,
(3) To conceal any such goods, wares or merchandise
with a like intent; or,
(4) To alter, remove, or otherwise disfigure any label
or price tag with a like intent; or,
(5) To transfer any goods, wares or merchandise from
a container in which the same shall be displayed to
any other container with a like intent;
and any person committing any of the acts mentioned shall
be guilty of shoplifting.
SECTION 2: Any person who aids or abets in the com-




SECTION 3: Possession of any goods, wares or merchan-
dise by any person in any mercantile establishment which
(1) Have been removed from the place of display and
concealed on or about the person of any such per-
son; or,
(2) Have any label or price tag altered by the person
in whose possession they are found; or,
(3) Have been transferred from the container in which
they were displayed to any other container;
shall be deemed prima facie evidence of an intent, on the
part of the person in whose possession they are found, to
appropriate the goods, wares or merchandise to his use,
and to deprive the owner of the possession, use, or the
value or a part thereof.
SECTION 4: A peace officer may, upon a charge being
made, and without a warrant, arrest any person whom
he has reasonable cause to believe has committed or at-
tempted to commit the crime of shoplifting, as heretofore
defined, in any mercantile establishment.
SECTION 5: Reasonable cause shall be a defense to a
civil or criminal action brought for false arrest, false im-
prisonment, or wrongful detention against a peace officer,
merchant, or merchant's employee, by a person suspected
of shoplifting of goods, wares or merchandise, as herein-
before provided, PRoViDED HowEvER that proof of the con-
viction of the person suspected of shoplifting of goods,
wares or merchandise shall be deemed irrebutable proof
of reasonable cause. The rule that statutes in derogation
of the common law shall be strictly construed shall not be
applied in the interpretation of this section, but the section
shall be interpreted to effectuate its intended purpose as
stated in the preamble hereof.
SECTION 6: Any person convicted of shoplifting shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor if the value of the goods, wares
or merchandise so taken or concealed is One Hundred
Dollars ($100.00) or less, and shall restore the goods,
wares or merchandise to the owner thereof, or pay the full
value therefor, and shall be fined or imprisoned, or both:
(1) For the first offense: Not more than One Hundred
Dollars ($100.00) or from Sixty (60) to Ninety
(90) days in jail, or both;
(2) For the second offense: Not more than Five Hun-
dred Dollars ($500.00), or from Three (3) to Six
(6) months in jail, or both;
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Any person convicted of shoplifting shall be guilty of a
felony if the value of the goods, wares or merchandise so
taken or concealed is more than One Hundred Dollars
($100.00), or if the person so convicted shall have been
twice before convicted of shoplifting, and shall restore
the goods, wares or merchandise to the owner thereof, or
pay the full value therefor, and shall be punished by fine
of not less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) nor more
than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), or by imprison-
ment for not less than Three (3) nor more than Seven (7)
years in the penitentiary, or by both fine and imprisonment.
SECTION 7: If any part, section, paragraph, clause, sen-
tence, or provision of this act shall be held invalid for any
reason, the remainder of this act, or other applications
thereof, shall not be affected thereby, and to this end, the
provisions of this act are declared severable.
SECTION 8: This act is declared to be in addition to any
other criminal provision heretofore existing in this state.
SECTION 9: All laws, or parts of laws, inconsistent with
the provisions of this act are hereby repealed to the extent
of the inconsistency.
SECTION 10: Nothing in this act shall affect any cause
of action which has accrued prior to the effective date
hereof.
NELSON R. KERR, JR.
Shades Of The Rule In Shelley's Case
Burnham v. Gas & Electric Company'
An action in ejectment was brought in the Circuit Court
of Baltimore County by the plaintiffs, Burnham and Lee,
against the defendant, Baltimore Gas & Electric Company.
The suit developed out of a deed executed on June 28, 1852,
by which Daniel and Nancy Warfield conveyed certain de-
scribed real estate to Eliza Ann Lee in trust for the joint
lives of her two infant children, Priscilla and Mary Ann
Lee, without impeachment of waste, and with remainder
to their heirs in fee simple. Eliza Ann Lee died in 1874.
Her daughter, Priscilla Lee, who was born in 1843, died
in 1861, leaving only one child, from whom the plaintiff,
Charles Frank Lee, Jr., was descended. Mary Ann Lee
married and had fourteen children, one of whom is the
plaintiff, Albert Washington Burnham. She died intestate
in 1943. In 1924, Mary Ann Lee purported to grant to the
1217 Md. 507, 144 A. 2d 80 (1958).
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